Al-Shabab: Guardians of Somali identity?
What are the reasons behind Al-Shabab survival in Somali politics?
British Channel 4 journalist Jamal Osman had an exclusive on al-Shabab
that included a training and graduation ceremony. The picture that
emerged was that al-Shabab is a sophisticated group which, more than
others, grasped the duality of the state; one of brutal efficiency in
employing force and in the second order, the ability to undertake
state's benign "soft" function: collecting garbage and ensuring
pharmacies stock unexpired drugs.
In popular state formation theories what distinguishes or indeed
makes a state a state, is its ability to project the use of force. By
being the
prominent purveyor of violence, the state increases the cost to
anyone who wants to challenge it, and also provides an incentive for a
group(s) to accept to be part of the state. Since its collapse,
Somalia's ability to function as a state and project the use of force
has been outsourced to external actors. As a result - nature abhors a
vacuum - al-Shabab or previously, warlords, filled in.
The group's overarching understanding that the centre of gravity- for
its survival- rests with the citizens, and not the state or external
actors, explains their durability. As long as they can provide security -
because they are the biggest source of violence anyway - and garbage is
collected in areas that they control, it buys them legitimacy, albeit
through fear.
While all external actors crave to be loved, al-Shabab thrives on
fear. In understanding Somalis, one has to struggle with the paradox of
being at once pastoral democrats - ready to negotiate some issues -and
an unflinching republican, some relations like family are
non-negotiable. Al-Shabab concentrated on the latter part. While Somalis
can trenchantly disagree over their clan politics, however, when it
comes to their sovereignty, both personal and collectively, they will
never negotiate. They are unrepentant nationalists, and in the absence
of a state, rhetorically and sometimes symbolically, al-Shabab acts as
the vanguard and the only reliable guardian of Somali nationalism and
identity.
This is further entrenched by the fact that the majority of the
post-1991 governments have not been organically constituted - they have
been externally midwifed, making al-Shabab a formidable custodian of the
Somali identity.
While al-Shabab has that luxury, monopoly really, the Somali
government has to juggle many contradicting and often competing
interests - the Turks who would want to show Somalia as the testing
ground for international Islamic brotherhood through a humanitarian
lens, the Europeans and the Americans who have a mortal fear of the
radicalisation of Somali youth immigrants, and the African Union that
wants to prove the dictum African solutions to Africa's problem.
Without any leverage, the Somali president/prime minister is left at
the mercy of all these and many actors. All the while al-Shabab is
capable of being run like a well-oiled machine. The Western countries
have, by default, reduced their footprints and focus on
counterterrorism. This is guided by rational calculations; limited
footprint means limited domestic political consequences, inoculating
themselves against accusation of invaders. But this singular focus on
terrorism by the West is akin to attempting to address the symptoms
rather than the cause of Somalia's crisis - a classic Band-Aid solution.
African countries are enamoured by an African solution to Africa's
problems, but they suffer from naively thinking that since we are fellow
Africans, Somalis will welcome us with flowers at the gates of
Mogadishu. Just like any other modern intervention, the window between
an intervention as liberation and invasion is small. In the case of the
AMISOM, they need to grasp that reality urgently, otherwise, their
genuine effort of winning over Afro-pessimists could be undone. In all,
everyone is in Somalia for their own interests rather than the Somalis',
and that explains why al-Shabab succeeds where others fail.
Another group that most external actors could learn from is the khat
distributors in Somalia. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, khat,
also known as miraa - a mild stimulant popular in East Africa and grown
in the Eastern part of Kenya - has been exported to Somalia during war
and peace. It is distributed more efficiently than any food aid. This
efficiency beats what any economist envisages when they speak about the
virtues of the unseen hand of the market. This is despite al-Shabab
banning khat as haraam - forbidden.
The group that has survived al-Shabab has an enduring lesson for all.
Khat distribution networks and their resiliency is a case study on how
to operate in a hostile environment. Maybe it is about time we undertake
an unbiased study of al-Shabab and khat distributors on how to
establish a state and an efficient distribution network of economic and
public goods - the key prerequisites of a state.
Abdullahi Boru Halakhe is a security analyst on the Horn of Africa
This article was originally published in Aljazeera
This article was originally published in Aljazeera
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