14 September 2013
Daniel Wagner & Giorgio Cafiero
Daniel Wagner & Giorgio Cafiero
Iran is determined to expand its influence in Africa, and Sudan has a unique role to play.
Recent geopolitical developments across the Middle East and Africa
have added momentum to Iran and Sudan’s strategic partnership, an
alliance driven primarily by an interest in weakening the power of
Israel, and by extension the US, throughout East Africa. Other
objectives include Sudan’s fight against other forces that constitute
existential threats to the Khartoum regime, and Iran’s interest in
establishing an alternative weapons corridor to Gaza and Lebanon,
particularly given that Syria will likely remain destabilized for the
near-to-medium term.
However, some of Sudan’s traditional Sunni Arab allies staunchly
oppose further development of the Iran/Sudan partnership. It remains to
be seen how far Khartoum can further entrench its ties with Tehran while
maintaining its alliance with Saudi Arabia and other states in the
region.
Background of Bilateral Ties
When President Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi rose to power in
the 1989 coup that established an Islamist state in Sudan, one of the
new regime’s first diplomatic initiatives was to forge an alliance with
Iran, whose own Islamic revolution a decade earlier inspired Sudan’s
Islamists (despite the Sunni-Shia division). Five months after the coup,
Bashir paid a visit to Iran and the two states’ intelligence agencies
signed cooperative agreements.
In 1991, then-Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited
Sudan pledging $17 million in financial aid, delivery of $300 million of
Chinese weapons, and 1 million tons of oil per year. Some 2,000 members
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were reportedly sent
to Sudan to train its Popular Defense Forces (PDF) during the second
Sudanese Civil War. That same year, Khartoum hosted the infamous Popular
Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC), which brought together Osama bin
Laden, Abu Nidal, Carlos the Jackal, and members of Jama’at
al-Islamiyah, Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRGC.
Over the years, Iran and Sudan have maintained varying degrees of
support for non-state actors, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad Movement in Palestine. In 2008, the two states officially signed a
military cooperation agreement, and in May of this year, the pace and
scope of the construction of Iranian naval and logistical bases in Port
Sudan was enhanced remarkably. In short, over the past two decades, the
two countries have significantly deepened their political ties, and in
the process, Sudan has become a magnet for a variety of militant
extremist and jihadist individuals and groups.
Proxy War in Africa
Sudan has at the same time become an extension of Iran’s proxy war
against Israel. Historically, Sudan and Israel’s relationship has been
hostile. In 2012, Israel bombed Sudan for the fourth time since 2009,
striking the Yarmouk factory near Khartoum. Israel’s motivation for
targeting Sudan was likely to punish Sudan for allowing Iran to use
Sudanese territory as a staging ground for arms shipments to Gaza and
Lebanon via the Red Sea and Egyptian Sinai, in addition to Khartoum’s
alleged support for Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups.
Israel knows that Sudan is a failed state with a military that is
preoccupied with South Sudan and Darfur, among other concerns, and that
Khartoum is not capable of responding directly to Israel. Simply put,
Bashir’s bluff has been called as a consequence of his inaction to
Israel’s air raids. Part of Israel’s message to Sudan’s government
appears to be to refrain from forging deeper ties with Iran and Hamas;
the more important message relates to Iran: If Tehran uses East Africa
as a launching pad for its Palestinian/Lebanese proxies, Israel will
apparently strike against Iran’s interests in the region.
Moreover, Israel has used its ally, South Sudan, in an effort to
further weaken Khartoum’s regional clout. This partnership far precedes
Iran and Israel’s standoff. During the first Sudanese Civil War
(1955-1972), Israel armed and trained the Southern Sudan Liberation
Movement (SSLM), which was consistent with the “alliance on the
periphery” pillar of Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy. After South Sudanese
independence in 2011, Juba’s diplomatic gestures toward Israel
established the world’s newest state as a staunch Israeli ally. In March
2012, an Iranian drone was shot down by Juba-backed rebels and the
Israelis have sent security experts to South Sudan to train their troops
to operate T-72 battle tanks. If Khartoum and Juba wage war over the
disputed oil-rich region of Abyei, Iran and Israel may be expected to
use their leverage to back their respective sides, further establishing
the Sudans as a battleground for one of the Middle East’s most dangerous
power struggles.
Eritrea is another important piece to this puzzle, as Asmara courts a
military partnership with Iran and Israel. From Eritrea’s perspective, a
potential Ethiopian invasion constitutes the gravest national security
threat. To counter this menace, Eritrea signed an agreement with Iran in
2008 that provides the Iranian military a presence in Assab (which for
official purposes is to safeguard an oil field).
However, for a number of reasons (the most important being to gain
greater support from Washington, which holds strong influence over Addis
Ababa), Eritrea appears to have sought balance in its partnership with
Iran by forming a relationship with Israel. Israeli naval teams have set
up in the Dablak Archipelago and Massawa, and have also reportedly
established a listening post in Amba Soira to monitor Iran’s presence in
the country. Israel has a difficult task, as deeper ties with Asmara
threaten to undermine its relationship with Addis Ababa. Nonetheless,
Israel will likely continue to nurture its partnership with Eritrea as
long as it serves to weaken Iran’s capacity to use East Africa to expand
Tehran’s strategic depth.
Sudan’s Gamble
Given that nearly three-quarters of Sudanese exports reach the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Khartoum is economically dependent
on states that would view the growth of Iran’s footprint in East Africa
as a significant geostrategic setback. As Saudi Arabia and Iran wage a
proxy war in Yemen, the build-up of Iran’s military presence in the Red
Sea is troublesome from the Saudi perspective. Voices within Sudan’s
opposition have criticized Bashir for permitting Tehran to establish a
greater military footprint in their country, on the grounds that
Sudanese-GCC ties will suffer and it undermines prospects for any
potential rapprochement with the United States.
From Bashir’s perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the most
imminent threats to his regime’s survival are reduced as a result of the
growing partnership with Iran. With Darfur rebels having struck major
blows against the Sudanese state earlier this year, and as the conflict
with South Sudan is likely to linger for years to come, the influx of
more advanced weapons and training from Iran should strengthen
Khartoum’s position.
Bashir has every reason to continue to deepen Sudan’s ties to Iran.
He knows that Iran is determined to expand its influence in Africa, and
that Sudan has a unique role to play in furthering that objective. Thus,
with Iran’s ongoing battle of words with Israel and the US over
Tehran’s nuclear program, the continuation of the Syrian crisis – which
threatens to break-up the Middle East’s “axis of resistance” — and the
tension between Sudan and South Sudan, Iran and Sudan have apparently
come to view each other as indispensable strategic partners for the long
haul.
The recent news that Zimbabwe has signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to sell Iran uranium will certainly raise the stakes in
Iran’s presumed pursuit of nuclear weapons, and will only serve as an
incentive for Sudan to enhance the role it is playing in broadening
Iran’s pursuit of power and influence in the Middle East and beyond.
There is no real incentive for them to change course, nor any meaningful
way for other countries to reduce the significance of the impact that
relationship has had, and will presumably continue to have, on Africa
and the Middle East. As a result, Sudan should be expected to continue
to play an indirect and influential role in the unfolding landscape of
Africa and the Middle East.
*[This article was originally published by the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis.]
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